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by Jeffrey Schaler,
Ph.D.
"[Addiction] is not a disease. And it
is not involuntary. And it is not a thing that causes people to engage in certain
behaviors." Click on the picture for more on this book, and check the FORCES Bookcase! |
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| Szasz on drug abuse as disease, excerpted from
The Bought Mind:
"Nobody called Churchill or Roosevelt an addict.
Now they would be called nicotine addicts. So addiction is not a descriptive term, it is a
stigmatizing term which is culturally conditioned. And it reflects not a property of
the drug, but a property of the culture. So in sum, drugs cannot cause
addiction."
- Dr. Thomas Szasz |
| "Using, abusing, and not
using drugs are decisions. Using a drug (or sex) solely for the purpose of
giving oneself pleasure used to be called a "sin" by Puritans, and a "bad
habit" by persons less certain about God's will. They were on the right
track. Drug abuse is neither a disease (except metaphorically), nor a
crime (unless we make it so). Drug abuse is a problem of desire: if people
did not want drugs, there would be no drug users and no drug abusers. The
desire for drugs has its source in two of the now all-but-forgotten "deadly
sins," lust and gluttony. People lust after the pleasures drugs can give,
and abuse drugs as gluttonously as they abuse food, sex, and often other
people."
- Dr. Thomas Szasz |
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Click
here for an interesting debate on addiction theory. |
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Preface by FORCES
If you like to smoke, drink or eat
chocolate, just sit in your favourite chair, get out some of your favourite addiction
stuff and read this paper, written in accessible language, yet highly documented.
Learn about the addiction myth - or should we say the addiction scam? Although the paper
(click on full title, below) analyses mainly nicotine, the addiction "theory" is
applicable to anything imaginable. There are very many definitions of addiction - all
equally flawed and meaningless, for addiction simply does not exist: public health is
trying to reduce gluttony to figures and percentages, thus arrogantly attempting to reduce
human beings to quantum entities. This pathetic attempt may serve the agendas of
pharmaceutical industries and opportunist politicians, but it is not
reality. People are
not addicted: they simply make choices based on cost-benefit, and rewards. They are
not
sick, and they don't need any cure by the Therapeutic State. Unloading personal
responsibility on others seems to be the unfortunate excuse of a spoiled generation, that
has chosen to point the finger at anyone or anything to justify its guilt for
overindulgence -- and its legitimate desire for pleasure and joy of living. That makes
today's society rabidly puritanical. We don't readily recognize this, since our new
puritanism is superficially different from the old, having become more open about sex and
having removed religious and overtly moral references from the discussion. Instead we have
the language of health, language about the body, not the spirit. It's a self-deception.
Below are a few excerpts from an eye-opening paper.
Source: Journal of Drug Issues
Publication date: 2001-04-01
THE EMPTINESS OF THE
DEFINITION
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Alarmist views of cannabis are now
considered quaint, whereas tobacco use is currently portrayed as a deadly addiction. |
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The fact that no momentous new evidence or
theoretical developments have appeared suggests that political and legal considerations
have taken precedence over scientific considerations considerations (Davies, 1997;
Epstein, 1990; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Pandina & Huber, 1990; Peele, 1991; Sullum,
1998). |
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As long as smoking is portrayed as an
inexorable addictive process, the success of cessation programs will be limited by a
self-fulfilling prophecy (Coleman, 1976; Drew, 1986; Fingarette, 1979; Fingarette, 1981;
Fingarette, 1990; Jensen & Coambs, 1994; Schwartz, 1992). |
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Addiction is used to describe behaviors
ranging from injecting heroin and cocaine, to smoking or chewing tobacco, drinking coffee,
eating chocolate, shopping, watching television soap operas (Jaffe, 1992), and falling in
love (Griffin- Shelley, 1993). There are reports of addiction to water (Kaplan, 1998),
cardiac defibrillators (Fricchione, Olson, & Vlay, 1989), carrots (Cerny & Cerny,
1992; Kaplan 1996), hormone replacement therapy (Bewley & Bewley, 1992), and numerous
other unusual entities (Glatt & Cook, 1987; Griffin-Shelley, 1993; Hodge, 1992;
Robinson, 1997; Solursh, 1989). The clinical literature is replete with examples of people
who develop unfortunate, even destructive, relationships with a great many substances,
objects, events, and people ( American Psychiatric Association, 1994). |
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It has yet to be demonstrated that nicotine
can exert more control over behavior than that exerted by any of scores of innocuous
substances and events. Moreover, smoking is almost always done along with something else.
The fact that smoking enhances a broad range of abilities (Pritchard & Robinson, 1994)
suggests that the user's behavior is not controlled by the substance. |
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Certain religions prohibit smoking on the
Sabbath, and even the heaviest smokers report no difficulty in observing this rule
(Shiffman, 1991). It is difficult to imagine a molecular dysfunction of the brain that
respects the Sabbath. |
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Under certain circumstances, nearly every
substance taken by man is psychoactive. Merely being detectable could mean psychoactive
(Goudie, 1991). This is another part of the definition that is so over-inclusive as to be
meaningless. |
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In the 1964 report on smoking and health,
the Surgeon General stated unequivocally that nicotine was not addictive (Ruxton &
Kirk, 1997). In 1988 he reversed this view (US Department of Health and Human Services,
1988). There were no scientific or clinical breakthroughs in this interval, but there was
a great deal of legal and political activity (Jones, 1992; Peele, 1992; Seltzer, 1997;
Taylor, 1984; Vallin, 1984; Warburton, 1994b). |
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The fact that the combined efforts of
thousands of scientists and legislators for fifty-odd years have not produced a single
rigorous definition suggests that they may be trying to define an undefinable.
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Nicotine meets some of the criteria for
being psychoactive, although even here there is a good deal of definitional uncertainty. |
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However, being psychoactive is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for abuse potential. A large number of psychoactive
substances have no abuse potential. |
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Nicotine does not produce anything like
intoxication. Indeed, nicotine facilitates many cognitive and motor functions (Damon et
al., 1997; Levin, Briggs, Christopher, & Rose, 1992; Rusted, Graupner, &
Warburton, 1995; Rusted & Warburton, 1995; Warburton 1994c, 1994d; Warburton &
Arnall, 1994). According to the National Institute of Drug Abuse criteria, nicotine is not
psychoactive. ... Thus nicotine self- administration is a poor model of even the
alkaloid aspects of smoking. |
THE MANIPULATED TEST METHODOLOGY IN
ANIMALS
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... Thus, the primate dose is 15150 times
higher than humans typically self-administer while smoking. |
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The most common nicotine dose used in
rodent self-administration studies is 30 (mu)g/kg (Chiamulera, Borgo, Falchetto, Valerio,
& Tessari, 1996; Corrigall & Coen, 1991 a), which is over 40 times higher than
typical human self-dosage. Studies in which nicotine is given as a pre-treatment use even
higher doses. In one such study, rats were given 400 (mu)g/kg, which is over 500 times
higher than humans selfadminister in a single puff and more than twice as much as even
very heavy smokers self-administer nasally over the course of an entire day (Tonnesen,
Mikkelsen, Norregaard, & Jorgensen, 1996). |
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If laboratory species will voluntarily take
a drug, it is assumed that humans will too. |
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...However, in marked contrast to humans,
smoking in infrahuman primates can only be established by coercive procedures (Ando,
Hironaka, & Yanagita, 1986). Moreover, once established, smoking in primates does not
produce any evidence of a habit; they stop at the first opportunity (Swedberg,
Henningfield, & Goldberg, 1990; Wood, 1990). |
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...Smoking does not appear to be
reinforcing for laboratory primates. |
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For example, Singer and Wallace (1984) show
maximum nicotine self-administration rates that are scarcely greater than those supported
by saline. This is far from being compulsive drug use. Animals will quickly learn to press
a lever thousands of times per hour to get cocaine (Iwamoto & Martin, 1988; Ward et
al., 1996). With nicotine, the highest self- administration rates ever reported in rats
are around 25 per hour (Corrigall & Coen, 1989). ... . Woolverton (1992) has shown
that monkeys respond at rates greater than 20 per hour for saline. |
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There are two notable exceptions to the
normally sluggish performance seen in nicotine self-administration experiments. Monkeys
pressed a lever for a brief visual stimulus occasionally accompanied by an intravenous
injection of nicotine (Goldberg, Spealman, & Goldberg, 1981). This second-order
schedule produced lever-press rates much higher than anyone has ever reported for
nicotine. However, there are a number of points that temper the usefulness of these data.
First, three of the four monkeys had been previously trained on a similar schedule for
cocaine. Additionally, in the absence of the signal, the monkeys performed as vigorously
when the drug was no longer available. This suggests an extremely strange phenomenon. The
peculiarity of these findings is further indicated by the fact that they have never been
replicated. A single, well- controlled and replicable instance of vigorous nicotine self-
administration would greatly strengthen the reinforcement thesis, yet no such instance
exists.
Monkeys are capable of extraordinarily vigorous operant behavior. However, this vigor can
also lead to interpretational difficulties. Monkeys may respond at extremely high rates
for almost anything. They may make hundreds of thousands of responses to self-administer
painful electric shocks (McKearney, 1968). This paradoxical behavior illustrates the
problems in interpreting operant behavior. To infer reinforcement processes, let alone
hedonic experience or addiction, from operant behavior requires numerous and tenuous
assumptions.
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Animals self-administer aspirin
(Hoffmeister & Wuttke, 1973) and caffeine (Atkinson & Enslen, 1976; Deneau,
Yangita, & Seevers, 1969; Sekita et al., 1992) As with nicotine, aspirin and caffeine
self- administration is not very vigorous and sometimes it may not occur a\t all (Heishman
& Henningfield, 1992). Since adverse effects on health have been associated with both
aspirin and caffeine (Bednar & Gross, 1999; Kiyohara et al., 1999) as with nicotine,
their use could be seen as meeting the principle criteria for addiction. |
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"Studies do not provide unequivocal
evidence for nicotine producing reward either via euphoric actions or through reduction of
pain, anxiety, or negative affect" (p. 20). |
THE UNRELIABILITY OF HUMAN TESTING
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Humans reported that intravenous injections
of nicotine felt similar to cocaine. The face appeal of these findings is reduced by
methodological problems. First, all of the subjects were hospitalized with unspecified
histories of substance abuse. Additionally, some of the subjects who reported that
nicotine was like cocaine had never experienced cocaine (Clark, 1990). Additionally, some
subjects thought nicotine was like cannabis, morphine, or Valium(R). Such gross errors
suggest that the subjects were fairly confused. Some subjects reported a "rush"
from the nicotine injection. Considering that they were given the nicotine content of
three cigarettes in one bolus, such an effect is not surprising. High doses of nicotine
often produce dizziness (Perkins et al., 1994) . |
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Another study in a similar group of
patients reported that intravenous caffeine produced subjective effects similar to those
of cocaine (Rush, Sullivan, & Griffiths, 1995). These subjects identified caffeine as
cocaine more often than they identified cocaine as cocaine! The subjective reports of
intravenous drug users are influenced by many processes with little relevance to human
drug taking (Iwamoto & Martin, 1988). |
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The fact that humans engage in many
behaviors in spite of numerous warnings of the attendant harms is not evidence of
addictive processes. It is testimony to human frailty and the ineffectiveness of fear in
controlling behavior. |
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Addiction is commonly portrayed as a brain
disease (Anonymous, 1997; Batter, 1996; Brautbar, 1995; Dani & Heinemann, 1996;
Leshner, 1996; Nash, 1997; Nutt, 1996; Rose, 1996) In spite of such claims, there is no
brain pathology or even special brain state uniquely associated with the use of any drug
in any species. Drugs of abuse change brain function (Di Chiara, 1995; Joseph, Young,
& Gray, 1996; Peele, 1990c). However, similar changes are also produced by relatively
innocuous substances and everyday events (Hernandez & Hoebel, 1988a, 1988b; Pfaus,
Damsma, Wenkstern, & Fibiger, 1995; Wilson, Nomikos, Collu, & Fibiger, 1995;
Yoshida, Yokoo, Mizoguchi, Kawahara, Tsuda, Nishikawa, & Tanaka, 1992; Young, Joseph,
& Gray, 1992). Such changes cannot reasonably be said to represent the neural
substrate of addiction. |
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